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change. In this respect, insurance is deemed to have the potential to contribute to at least six SDGs. 6 Similarly, there is growing emphasis on insurance in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) processes. In 2015, climate risk transfer was given a significant boost by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the COP21 Paris Agreement, and the Group of Seven (G7) InsuResilience initiative aiming to insure an additional 400 million vulnerable individuals against climate risks by 2020, supported by G7 commitment of 550 million USD.
Much of the literature on index insurance addresses the virtues of the product, technical considerations, and difficulties in scaling up. Less attention has been paid either to how farmers' access to index insurance interfaces with inequalities already present in farming populations, or of the differential social impact of index insurance schemes upon an already heterogeneous rural population.
Studies exploring socio-economic and welfare issues include Bageant and Barrett (2017) , Chantarat et al. (2017) , Janzen and Carter (2013) , Jensen et al. (2015 , Jensen and Barrett (2017) , Peterson and Osgood (2016) , and Taylor (2016) . Whilst studies increasingly explore socio-economic dynamics, including those related to inequality and unequal power relations, debate on index insurance and social equity per se is limited although research is starting to highlight the need for more attention to be directed towards equity dimensions (Müller et al., 2017; Reeves, 2017) .
In this article, we suggest that as a form of micro-insurance, more attention needs to be directed to issues of social equity if index insurance is to be considered a socially sustainable climate change adaptation tool tailored to the needs of the poor. An oft-repeated dictum is that poor people in developing countries carry the burden of impacts from climate change while contributing little to its causes. Considering index insurance from an equity perspective, raises the moral proposition that farmers ought not to pay an insurance premium to adapt to climate risks they have not created. We do not dismiss this proposition. Rather, operating as we do on projects and research within countries where index insurance is being rolled out to millions of farmers (often combined with other products and services that farmers may or may not pay for themselves), we seek to stimulate discussion over whether and how attention to social equity can increase fair access to opportunities afforded by index insurance.
For us, this opens up the potential to ensure climate change adaptation is linked to more equitable social transformation. We recognise that index insurance cannot be a panacea to generate fair 6 Namely: SDG 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere; SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; SDG 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; SDG 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; SDG 13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (Wanczeck et al., 2017) .
outcomes beyond the scope of the intervention, but at the very least there is a need to avoid worsening existing inequalities.
To explore issues of social equity in the context of index insurance and climate risk management, we draw on learning from CGIAR's 7 research program on Climate Change Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). 8 Some of this learning is captured in Greatrex et al., (2015) . It is also informed by our participation in international meetings 9 that reflect increasing interest in the role of index insurance in agricultural development (e.g. the Global Index Insurance Facility managed by the World Bank Group).
Linked to this learning, we explore social equity issues in the context of two index insurance schemes in East Africa: Index-based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) and Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise Ltd.
(ACRE). The schemes were selected to provide contextually specific comparison and contrast to demonstrate processes shaping distributional outcomes. The examples draw on published information but are also informed by authors' first-hand engagement with these schemes (Greatrex et al., 2015; Hellin, J. et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2014 Jensen et al., , 2015 Jensen and Barrett, 2017) .
We examine the following questions: firstly, what are the social equity implications of index insurance in the context of climate risk management? Secondly, how can greater attention be paid to social equity considerations within index-insurance initiatives? And, thirdly, what policy challenges are raised by taking social equity into account as a mechanism for climate risk reduction? To address these questions, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces index insurance. Section 3 turns to definitional issues on social equity as a basis for Section 4, which presents an equity assessment framework for index insurance and illustrates our argument with the cases of IBLI and ACRE. Sections 5 and 6 are our discussion and conclusions. For countries where smallholder farming dominates the agricultural sector and where rural poverty levels are high, significant technological innovation is considered a prerequisite for agricultural transformation in the face of climate change (World Bank, 2008; FAO, 2015) . This is especially the case for so-called climate-smart agriculture; namely, agricultural practices and technologies that contribute to increased food security, as well as climate change adaptation (and mitigation) in a sustainable way (Neufeldt et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2018) . Decades of research have, however, identified risk and risk aversion as key impediments to farmer adoption of improved agricultural technologies and promotion of market-based development (Dercon, 2005; Carter et al., 2016) . Advocates of agricultural index insurance herald it as a mechanism to manage this risk and to improve smallholder production.
Harvest failure due to climatic events, economic fluctuations and illness are prominent among the risks faced by rural households. Such risks may be idiosyncratic, affecting an individual or household, or aggregate, affecting a community or region (Dercon, 2005) . Index insurance, which protects farmers from a clearly identified hazard, is designed for aggregate risk that covers a large area and therefore many farming households (e.g. area yield assessment) or a specific climate risk that negatively impacts farmer livelihoods in a given location (e.g. weather-based index insurance) (Greatrex et al., 2015) . Payouts are triggered not by observed crop losses, but rather when a proxy (index) -such as the amount of rain during a certain period or the average yield over a larger area -falls above or below a pre-specified
threshold. An index can be based on any objective data source for which there is an historical record and that closely correlates to the loss that is the subject of concern.
An agricultural insurance product will never remove all of the risks faced by a farmer and many programmes are 'single peril', covering a specific risk. Index insurance is therefore most effective at mitigating the impacts of risk in locations where there is an over-riding, externally measurable peril, which is causing substantial negative impact. It also works best where losses are homogenous in a defined area and highly correlated with the indexed peril (Elabed et al., 2013; Ye et al., 2017) . To date, most index insurance efforts have focused on the risk of rainfall deficit, i.e. drought, although other indices are available (Dick and Stoppa, 2011; Greatrex et al., 2015) .
Index insurance against yield loss allows specific risks to be transferred to agricultural insurance markets. It is posited that this can increase farmers' access to credit: by taking up insurance, climate risk can be addressed and, hence, banks and other lenders are encouraged to make loans to farmers which, in turn, facilitate farmer' investment in productivity, including the use of new agricultural technologies such as drought tolerant crop varieties (Bobojonov et al., 2014; World Bank, 2015) , that have medium- 
and long-term climate adaptation implications. Hence, insurance can increase resilience not only by providing a pay-out in bad years, thus helping farmers to protect their assets, but also by enabling farmers to improve production in better years (Greatrex et al., 2015; Hellmuth et al., 2009 ).
Climate change adaptation can be achieved either through bundling of farm inputs with insurance, or through including insurance within a larger risk management portfolio. Examples of the former include ACRE (GSMA, 2015) , and insurance linked with credit in Zambia (Mellitus, 2015) . The R4
Rural Resilience Initiative is an example of the latter approach whereby farmers can pay for the insurance through labor on climate-smart agricultural projects (Food for Assets), alongside access to credit and savings (Madajewicz, 2017) . Insurance contracts are increasingly 'bundled' with other products (on a mandatory or voluntary basis), including productivity-enhancing inputs and credit to improve farmer uptake of technologies and to increase financial institutions' willingness to lend.
However, despite popularity, rigourous evidence of the impact of 'bundling', such as combining insurance and credit, is to-date limited (Marr et al., 2016) .
Expanding Index Insurance
Emerging in the 1980s, index insurance is now reaching millions of farmers. Hess and Hazell (2016) (Thorburn, 2017 ).
At the micro-level are programmes to promote policies purchased by individuals or groups, like livestock herders in Mongolia or East Africa (Hellmuth et al., 2009; World Bank, 2015) or rice farmers in Haiti (Bélanger, 2016) . At meso-level, are so-called risk aggregators, insuring entities rather than individuals (banks, microfinance institutions, agri-businesses or national export companies), like ACRE, described in Section 4. Straddling meso and macro-level are schemes being scaled-up country-wide, such as the Zambian Government incorporating weather index insurance into its Farmer Input Support Programme using a dataset generated at the University of Reading (Maidment et al., 2017; Mellitus, 2015) . At macro-level, insurance involves sovereign cover, examples include budget support to the Government of Malawi in the case of drought (Hess and Syroka, 2005) and the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC), a pan-African drought risk facility building a shared safety net between African nations (ARC, 2016).
There are technicalities that effect both scaling and reliability of index insurance. An important aspect relates to the existence and reliability of relevant data. Index insurance lowers transaction costs compared to indemnity insurance but also introduces basis risk, which is the difference between actual loss and the payout on an insurance contract. For index insurance targeted at individual farmers (i.e.
micro-level) basis risk can result in a farmer experiencing yield loss, but not receiving a payout, or in a payout being triggered without any loss being experienced (Dick and Stoppa, 2011) . As Thorburn (2017) highlights, micro-level stakeholders -for whom potential for basis risk is greatest -are least able to withstand adverse basis risk, compared to those within meso and macro-level schemes. Even at a macro-level, however, there is criticism of the assumptions built into an insurance model, having a negative impact on the poorest farmers that reinforces existing inequalities (Reeves, 2017) .
Characterized as the 'Achilles heel' of index insurance , basis risk has implications for farmer demand for the product, the value that insurance policies hold for clients, and for the cost to insurance companies. If basis risk and price elasticity are correlated, mechanisms to lower basis risk are vital for increasing demand (Marr et al., 2016) . In this regard, new modelling, for example based on advances in remote-sensing and on proxy-based climate reconstructions, is extending instrumental records by hundreds of years and/or providing increasingly greater accuracy for climate information at high temporal resolution (Bell et al., 2013) .
Many index insurance schemes (micro, meso and macro) rely on public support to facilitate greater involvement of private insurers, and to enhance farmer uptake. This ranges from high public sector intervention, led by government, to public-private partnerships (PPP), or private system led interventions (Varangis, 2017) . State (and donor) involvement is varied, ranging from provision of an enabling regulatory environment; incorporating financial incentives; developing information systems;
ensuring consumer protection; investing in farmer education, weather stations and agro-meteorological research and data systems; and facilitating international reinsurance or subsidies to correct initial market failures and externalities that hold back the development of markets for index insurance products (GIIF, 2015) . Public support can also include a subsidy for the cost of the premium to make it affordable for farmers; such subsidies are controversial and subject to on-going debate (Hazell, et al., 2017; Ricome et al., 2017) . Nevertheless, when index insurance aims to achieve development objectives, these subsidies may be used to ensure a pro-poor focus, targeting poorer categories of farmers (Hellmuth et al., 2009) . In this context, affordability for poor and vulnerable people helps respond to questions of social equity (Schaefer and Waters, 2016 
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Discussions surrounding index insurance tend to focus on how the field is market-led and driven by the insurance and reinsurance industries who are motivated by business opportunities and ability to make a profit. An understandable, but in our view overly simplistic, conclusion is that there is little opportunity to introduce consideration of social equity. This stance may be underpinned by concerns over the morality of making poor farmers in developing countries pay for climate change risks generated by the developed world. However, we caution against quick judgements. With a multiplicity of stakeholders engaged in the promotion of index insurance, 11 there are those for whom questions over the distribution of benefits and burdens, and of differential social impact -in short concerns over fair allocation -are highly pertinent. These stakeholders include farming communities and their representatives but also, pertinently, national governments, public donors and non-governmental organisations, namely those seeking to reduce poverty while also being answerable to taxpayers and gift-givers.
Equity and Equality
Social equity is concerned with fairness and justice in how people are treated in society (Guy and McCandless, 2012) . This implies considering how things -e.g. power, rights, resources, opportunities -are socially distributed, agreeing on principles for distribution, and ensuring distribution is consistent with these principles (Jones, 2009) . Focusing on social equity helps us to consider how social difference and associated inequalities may affect poor people's access to index insurance, and how processes of programme design and implementation can contribute to the distribution of fair outcomes.
There are crucial differences between equality and (social) equity. Equality refers to being the same or being treated equally. However, while equity also relates to equivalence, it may mean treating people differently to overcome barriers that can impede the realisation of equal outcomes. As Sen (1992: iv) emphasizes, societies are diverse and human diversity is not a secondary complication to be ignored or introduced 'later on'; inequality is always present and is fundamental to a concern over equity. If principles of distribution address barriers that disadvantage some social groups more than others then seeking equality of outcomes, in terms of fairness and justice, may be a valid goal. For 11 Index insurance stakeholders include farmers, farmer groups, extension officers, agricultural input suppliers, insurers, insurance pools, insurance intermediaries, re-insurers, governments and public institutions, international and local NGOs, bilateral and multi-lateral donors, national meteorological agencies, remote sensing bodies, research institutions, banks, and multi-lateral finance institutions, amongst others.
example, gender barriers may require differential targeting of women to ensure equal outcomes with men.
Our approach is informed by thinking on distributive justice (e.g. Walzer, 1983; Rawls, 2009; Frederickson, 2010) , as developed within work addressing equity with respect to -variously -ecosystem services, fair trade and biofuels (Blaber-Wegg et al., 2015; Howard et al., 2016; McDermott et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2014; Sikor, 2013) . Like these studies, we treat social equity as multi-dimensional and relating to both processes and outcomes. Furthermore, our emphasis is on how considerations of social equity emerge in specific contexts, as claims over resources, responsibilities and distribution are made and contested . This contrasts with a normative approach that applies universal principles to an empirical context (following Rawls, 2009). A strength of a contextually-grounded approach is that facilitates understanding of the dynamics of social equity in practice, including potential tensions between competing claims at different scales (Howard et al., 2016) .
Index Insurance through the Lens of Social Equity
To ensure index insurance is as fair as possible raises the question of how issues relevant to social equity can be incorporated into the design and implementation of index insurance interventions. We present a social equity assessment framework in Table 1 to help 'unpack' these equity issues. (Dror et al., 2014: 10) . Since 2014, IBLI no longer ties its indices (including those in Kenya) to livestock mortality. The index now uses statistics to standardize observations in relation to historic observations. The index has also been disaggregated so households in different locations can receive more tailored contracts, reducing the affect of idiosyncratic shocks .
Since inception in 2012, IBLI's philosophy has evolved, from emphasis on asset replacement to asset protection (Carter et al., 2018) . Technical and product design and implementation has also changed, with contracts adjusted to improve accuracy, to generate indemnity payments earlier, and to make the drought indices more generalizable and scalable. Nevertheless, basis risk and insurance product quality remain key challenges, as do implementation mechanisms and financing (Carter et al., 2018) .
To turn to provide background on ACRE before focusing on social equity considerations: in contrast to the research institution/donor-led makeup of IBLI, ACRE represents itself as the largest private sector-led index-based insurance programme in Africa, although it too has received World Bank/IFC-GIIF funding. ACRE aims to mitigate risk of weather shock on agricultural production, its target is smallholder farmers in general, with insurance 'bundled' with other products ( , UAP Insurance and Swiss Re backed by IFC GIIF. In 2014, it became the company ACRE. ACRE's most popular product is a replacement guarantee scheme for maize seed, but it also covers other crops, loans and dairy insurance (Ribeiro, 2017) . In 2017 ACRE piloted 'top-up' cover to extend coverage for the entire season, not only the germination phase, but farmers need to pay the additional premium themselves.
ACRE's design incorporates five key partners: farmers and/or farmer groups, the microinsurance provider (insurers/reinsurers), seed companies and distributors, mobile network operators, and agrovets who give information and supplies (Wills, et al., 2015) . In 2017, an agreement was signed with the Kenya Agriculture and Livestock Research Organisation (KALRO), to exploit so-called synergies, signaling a move to incorporate a state institution as a further partner.
For small-scale farmers, an organisation/company ("farmer aggregator") is insured on their behalf (co-operative bank, agribusiness/seed company, etc.); large-scale farmers buy directly. The aggregator pays for a percentage of the insurance cost and subsequent payout, a donor pays the remainder based on a subsidy model (Wills et al., 2015: 16) . The aggregator is held to benefit through return customers and information about farmer practices. For the maize seed guarantee scheme, a farmer buys a bag of seed containing a card code active for 21 days, they register through SMS and the 13 Syngenta is a large agri-business company based in Switzerland.
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Equitable Access, Procedures, Representation and Outcomes
We turn to outline different social equity dimensions of IBLI and ACRE, summarised in Table 3 . (2017), Chantarat et al. (2017) , Dror et al. (2014) , Jensen et al. (2015) . ACRE: Goslinga (2012), Wills et al. (2015) , IIF (2017) .
IBLI
The chief objective of IBLI is to extend insurance to a marginalized population with little access to modern financial tools; by implication, it was developed with social equity in mind. Equity of access is factored into IBLI contracts in four ways: firstly, because calculations are based on standardized TLU, different livestock types can be insured. Secondly, any herd size can be covered, from as little as one goat or sheep held by the poorest families. This is important in a region where herd composition, plus access to and control over different types of livestock assets, often correlates with socio-economic status, ethnic background and/or gender. Thirdly, in 2014, Takaful Insurance of Africa (TIA) developed a Shariah-compliant variant of IBLI that is available to both Muslims and non-Muslims, which has met with relatively high uptake and is expanding at a rate greater than its secular counterpart.
That IBLI has been led by research organizations and donor funding has been a driver for procedural equity; indeed without consistent support from development partners, it is unlikely that IBLI would have become well-established in marginalised areas. This has challenges. IBLI was conceived as a commercially sustainable scheme. Early on, however, it was realised that a public subsidy was needed to build demand and cover marketing and investment, with an economic case that it was cheaper for government/donors than welfare subsidies (Dror et al., 2014) . There was however concern over market distortions detrimental to long-term sustainability.
The IBLI products have generated unintended consequences concerned with procedural equity connected to insurance markets. One consequence relates to targeting IBLI coverage towards remote rangelands inhabited by the most vulnerable herders. Two insurance companies stopped selling IBLI products because they preferred to operate in more accessible areas, but the IBLI Team and donors
were not prepared to support insurance companies in these areas. 14 Moreover, in a move towards commercialization, ILO-funded subsidies were withdrawn from "Village Insurance Promoters" causing many to stop working (Dror et al., 2014) . Research also finds -marginal -procedural issues related to gender, in which female headed-households purchase at an equal rate to men, but may be more vulnerable to pressure from sales agents (Bangeant and Barrett, 2017).
KLIP has also created procedural tensions between government-supported social protection and the functioning of insurance markets. Unintentionally, inequity has been built into the system through a strategy of providing free insurance, which carries the danger of undermining the fragile private insurance market. Ironically, given the objective of providing a mechanism for social protection, this may be a threat to equity in terms of limiting access to insurance. Such fears have led commercial providers and other stakeholders to push KLIP to replace free insurance with targeted insurance subsidies.
Issues of representation are apparent in relation to demand for insurance. Assertions regarding pastoralists weak understanding of insurance products highlight vast differences in knowledge and values, both about risk and about insurance. They can also be played out in pastoralists' experiences of basis risk, when on-the-ground impact of idiosyncratic climate risk differs from the index. Issues of representation are recognised insofar as emphasis is placed on the need to "educate": insurance simulation games, edutainment videos, plays and cartoon-strips have each been deployed (Dror et al., 2014) . Research by Takahashi et al. (2016) in Ethiopia cautions against assumptions this will increase uptake; it was found that "Learning Kits" increased understanding but not purchases, which instead rose when discount coupons were distributed.
Regarding equitable distribution, IBLI/IBLT and KLIP are products targeted at poorer and vulnerable groups of pastoralists, with coverage across pastoral populations expanding, suggesting a strong distributive justice orientation from the outset. An estimate of total cumulative insured assets since the inception of IBLI is approximately US$13 million. KLIP alone has insured approximately US$9.8m. Nevetheless, while recognising IBLI's distributive orientation, evidence suggests (Chantarat et al., 2017) that IBLI is of most benefit as a risk-management tool for pastoralists who are vulnerable (20-30 TLU) and in danger of falling into poverty (10-20 TLU) (i.e. 47% of the population) but can realise the benefits of index insurance. It is of least benefit to the poorest with meagre asset endowments where 14 Personal correspondence with A. Mude, IBLI project leader. drought leads to herd collapse (<10 TLU; 26% of the population); and not so vital for wealthier pastoralists (27 % of the population).
In this respect, cash transfers, such as through the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), may act as better social protection for the poorest households, and with asset-building capacity (cf. Fisher et al., 2017) . Comparison between IBLI and HSNP leads Jensen et al (2014) to conclude that beneficial impacts flow from both programes; they do, however, highlight how their different cost structures mean that IBLI's impact per unit cost are higher than HSNPs. We reflect on the public policy implications of these equity issues below.
ACRE
Social equity parameters within ACRE's approach flow from a business model predicated on the volume of registrations, "the more, the better" (Wills et al., 2015: 19) . Volume is needed to diversify insurance risk exposure and to reduce premiums. ACRE identifies low up-take as a challenge, alongside reliable long-term data for indices, coupled with poor farmer financial literacy (IIF, 2017).
With ACRE, small-holder farmers previously excluded from formal insurance gain access to insurance; this carries the potential to stimulate greater equity, especially as products are also tailored to their purchasing capacity. For example, with the "replanting guarantee", farmers can purchase protection for a single bag of seed or fertilizer, with money reimbursed if there is poor rainfall; they do not have to make a substantial outlay of money. Nevertheless, unlike IBLI, there is no formal effort to target marginalised groups (geographically/socially) beyond a general theory of change that smallholder farmers are 'better off' if insurance reduces the climate risk enough to enable the uptake of new technology.
The scope for equitable procedures flows from product design. Kenya was chosen as the initial location for the programme, partly because it had a developed mobile money economy, thus reducing costs. Premia and payments can be paid by MPESA (mobile money transfers). This enhanced access for farmers in rural locations because registration could be conducted by mobile phone and farmers location remotely identified for the insurance contract. Trust in the product was also built by selling through agrovets (enabled through links to the Syngenta Foundation).
As with experiences in other index insurance schemes, there can be significant gaps in understanding between farmer knowledge of climate risk / poor financial literacy and intervention assumptions. Agrovets too misunderstand the product. This raises questions regarding how farmers' and local stakeholders' knowledge is represented to ensure the product is appropriate. These issues are Accepted Article apparent in difficulties experienced by ACRE, although often implicit and put down to the need for consumer education. Wills et al. (2015) reports that for insurance bundled within the seed guarantee scheme, both farmers and agrovets assumed the insurance card in seed bags was a certificate of authenticity or guarantee. Thus, as Ribeiro (2017) highlights, many farmers did not access free insurance from the card available with their seed purchase. The card was redesigned to make it clearer; field promoters were also hired to raise farmer awareness. Finally, telesales operators were instructed to call farmers back to help with registration if an error occurs during enrollment.
ACRE's design and implementation carries the potential to exclude access by the poorest smallholders. Initially, Kilimo Salama had a clear internal focus on reaching the poorest farmers, offering a free product in trials. 15 Working with farmer groups also proved effective and a way to enrol poorer farmers plus also women. For example, according to Goslinga (2012) in 2009, 185 individual farmers (1-2 acres) acquired insurance and by 2012 this had risen to 7,000. In contrast in 2010, 8,000 members of farmer groups (0.5-1 acre) acquired insurance and by 2012 this had risen to 65,000. Of individual farmers 65% were male, whilst of group members 60% were female. Nevertheless, despite some success, there was low trust in the product, the fact it was free was apparently greeted with suspicion (Goslinga, 2012) . Demand was lowest from the poorest farmers.
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As the initiative expanded, the focus of the product moved to farmers who visit agrovets and have access to a mobile phone. This also linked to the approach of the Syngenta Foundation, which aims to improve productivity and value chain access for "pre-commercial" farmers, often in semi-arid areas, who display potential for agricultural growth, enabling them to become "more professional growers"
(Syngenta, not dated). There is little evidence to suggest whether (or not) the insurance product attracted new farmers to purchase inputs from these agrovets or who are purchasing farmers. Evidence from ACRE's work in Rwanda suggests that insurance is most likely to be purchased by households that either own a house or have the capacity to rent, and which have some food security, and at least one person in the household earns wage income from casual labor (Ashimwe, 2016) . For such households it is estimated that insurance has a positive impact on farmer income of between $90-105 USD (Ashimwe, 2016) . In Kenya, ACRE's work has also been found to increase wealth, but again to 'better-off' poor households (e.g. land owners of 1-2 Ha), with assets and a degree of food security, not the poorest (Sibiko, 2016 
Discussion
The cases of IBLI and ACRE provide insight into the parameters of social equity concerns.
'Unpacking' different dimensions of social equity -access, procedures, representation and distributiongives a nuanced view of how social equity considerations are played out and helps to identify relevant policy dilemnas.
Both interventions seek to extend micro-insurance to small-holder farming/pastoral populations previously excluded from access to insurance. Thus, as a climate risk management tool, their orientation carries potential to build greater fairness in access to benefits from insurance and related products. At face value IBLI products have greater potential for targetting the poorest and most vulnerable within pastoral populations, given that this has been an overarching goal when compared to ACRE's approach.
Nonetheless, in different ways, both grapple with similar difficulties that challenge how to incorporate fair distribution into design and implementation. Foremost is the need to build a commercially viable product at a premium farmers/pastoralists can afford. Linked to this is the need for confidence in the product, foremostly through minimization of basis risk, alongside aspects relevant to good product design and customer financial literacy. Both IBLI and ACRE products receive premium subsidies and in this respect, donors have played a significant role in driving social equity goals through both premium subsidy and wider targeting decisions. Government up-take of KLIP, linking to social protection, has also facilitated distributive functions of IBLI.
Whilst recognizing over-arching challenges, both interventions have sought to capture opportunities for generating (more) equitable outcomes: for example IBLI by use of TLU's, such that small livestock can be covered, and by providing cover to any herd size; also through a sharia-compliant product, and through refining the insurance index for greater accuracy and reduction of basis risk. For ACRE, working with aggregators facilitates coverage to farming groups whose members have small landholdings, and through innovative forms of farmer-accessible 'bundling'; farmers can "try out insurance" by insuring as little as one bag of seed with any payout transferred to the farmer's "mobile phone wallet" (IIF, 2017).
For both IBLI and ACRE products, implementation with regard to sales mechanisms highlights weaknesses with respect to social equity. For IBLI/IBLT, the sales agent structure and incentive scheme introduces weaknesses: sales agents are usually recruited from local populations and provided with commissions for sales; the result is variability in sales, some of which is likely to be associated with the quality of the sales agents (Chelenga et al., 2015) . Importantly, it is likely that agent quality is correlated 
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to access to services and thus living standards, thus one might expect that a region with relatively higher rates of poverty has less educated sales agents, which could lead to poorer insurance extension.
Commission-based pay may compound the issue, providing little motivation for strong extension campaigns in regions where one might expect demand to be low (e.g., because poverty rates are high, because residents are unlikely to understand the product). Moreover, Bageant and Barrett (2017: 949) highlight how the influence of sales agents may have gender dimensions, due to women being vulnerable to pressure by sales agents.
In contrast to IBLI, whose direct customers are pastoralists, for ACRE's products, direct customers are the seed/input companies who sell to farmers. This has an impact on how the product is marketed, what the educational campaigns are and how the product is integrated into farmer decisionmaking. The internal debate is often less about 'subsidies for the poorest', but rather who pays and why.
Social equity becomes a question of improving market access; the social impact is therefore inextricably tied to the bundled product.
A second weakness of both interventions has been leveled at insurance as a development tool per se (e.g. Binswanger-Mkhize 2012). Essentially, those with sufficient liquidity to afford premiums probably have the greatest access to substitutes and may not need insurance, while those that need it may lack liquidity. For IBLI this argument is further nuanced: only wealthier pastoralists may afford full IBLI insurance premiums, but a middle category of vulnerable non-poor may stand to benefit from index insurance, as opposed to the poorest for whom asset-building social protection is more appropriate.
This leads Chantrat et al. (2017) to conclude that the public policy implications are for subsidy support to be targeted at the vulnerable non-poor, although this maybe politically unpalatable.
For IBLI, it is also possible that the timing of the insurance sales windows exacerbate liquidityrelated differences because those windows are during historically lean months, for example, at the end of the dry seasons. There is limited evidence of this specific to IBLI but HSNP cash transfers to the poorest seem to cause increased demand of IBLI (Jensen et al., 2014) . It is possible that cash transfers released a liquidity constraint and that evidence of increased insurance uptake is due to the increased income.
For ACRE, there is evidence that farmers chose to buy the bundled insurance /seed products because the insurance is an additional statement about seed authenticity rather than because of the climate protection (Wills et al., 2015) . Often, reaching different groups of farmers comes as a side product to expanding market access. For example, it is logistically easiest to attach insurance to 10kg bags of seed (restricting access to farmers who need that amount and can transport it to their fields). 
Insurance companies are now pushing for insurance to be added to smaller seed bags in order to grow their market, in effect enabling more disadvantaged farmers to buy the product. A social equity lens has to take this complexity into account.
Conclusions
If agricultural index insurance is to be a climate change adaptation tool that is tailored to the needs of the poor in developing countries, attention needs to be paid to issues of social equity. The allure of index insurance can mask issues of power, social inequality and differential impact in rural communities. The need to be cognizant of the danger of implicitly reinforcing inequality through the design and delivery of index insurance highlights how more consideration needs to be given to the way up-take of index insurance is shaped by existing inequalities and, in turn, how these inequalities contribute to differential development outcomes for small-holder farmers/pastoralists. To this end, we have presented an equity assessment framework to unpack different dimensions of social equity in order to facilitate debate on whether and how a fair(er) distribution of benefits can be achieved.
We acknowledge that bringing social equity to the fore poses moral and practical dilemmas for those engaged in the design and promotion of index insurance. Indeed the cases of IBLI and ACRE highlight the balancing acts and unintended consequences of integrating social equity with both commercial sustainability and wider policy goals on climate risk reduction and social protection. For policy-makers there are no simple solutions. A long-standing debate within index insurance circles is whether insurance should be subsidized to make it more accessible to poorer farmers. This is echoed within social equity concerns, for example, subsidising the insurance premium could ensure that the benefits of the index insurance are shared across the farming population, however, such an approach can also distort the market.
Do we need to acknowledge that the main target group for index insurance is actually a 'better off' category of nevertheless vulnerable farmers? If so, does it therefore, make more sense to focus on effective interventions for this group at the expense of the distribution of benefits to the poorest and most vulnerable farmers? Or can more judicious targeting and innovative mechanisms be encouraged that ensure greater access to index insurance for a larger group of poor farmers, including marginalized categories, such as poor women or single headed households? If the poorest, most asset-constrained farmers/pastorlists are to benefit from climate risk reduction, a conclusion is the need to integrate index insurance within a wider social protection system providing cash, assets or food transfers. But this is no panacea given difficulties of developing effective synergies between programmes that actually work to support farmers, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Expert debate about index insurance tends to treat farmers as a homogenous group and largely ignores issues of equity. Answers to each of the aforementioned questions challenges researchers, development practitioners and policy makers to address the issues of differential access to index insurance and how burdens and benefits are allocated across rural society. By so doing, the focus of the debate expands from one on agricultural systems in transition to a broader -and we acknowledge more complicated -debate on agricultural systems and social transformation, which inevitably opens up issues of power and politics.
Given the will, we contend that paying attention to the parameters of social equity within index insurance interventions, may well help ensure that outcomes are more equitable, with greater potential for inclusion and fairer distribution. We recognise there are no simple solutions but suggest that debate over social equity will lead to greater clarity over the development contribution that can be made by index insurance, together with refinement of the evidence-base for assessing outcomes. This is especially impotant in light of the millions of dollars that donors and governments are targeting at index insurance and the arguments that these investments will contribute to the realization of some of the SDGs, including poverty reduction and gender equality.
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